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1 Introduction
I benefitted much from studying this collection of essays. In many cases, they made
me appreciate implications and consequences of my own work which I had not seen
at all, or only partially. The whole collection shows that, despite the criticisms, the
philosophy of information provides a very fruitful conceptual framework within
which new philosophical issues can be addressed and old ones revived. As the reader
will see, in many cases fruitful disagreements take place against the background of
considerable convergences on what count as interesting problems and valuable
methods to tackle them. I am grateful to all contributors for their time and efforts and
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for the rare privilege of seeing my research evaluated so thoroughly. Criticism,
sometimes even more than praise, is often a clear sign of intellectual interest. In my
replies, I have tried to address what seemed to me the main issues or contentions
contained in each contribution, while providing an overall narrative. I hope I have
not completely failed in both tasks. I am much indebted to Hilmi Demir, who
patiently and carefully dealt with the editing of this special issue and my delays.
Without his encouragement and commitment, I would not be writing these lines.
2 Reply to Gillies
I have gained many insights from Gillies in the past, especially about the philosophy
of artificial intelligence (AI), and I can see that I still have much to learn. His elegant
and thoughtful article opens a very interesting perspective on the variety of
structuralist philosophy of mathematics that might be promoted following the sort of
philosophy of information that I have been supporting (see now Floridi 2010b).
Gillies’ interpretation of my position as friendly towards a Platonist approach is
correct, and his view that my implicit Platonism has a Popperian strand is indeed
most perceptive. There is no reason why he should have browsed through an old
book of mine, but in Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology (Floridi 1996,
see especially Chapter 7), I discussed at length Popper’s World 3 hypothesis as well
as his arguments in favour of an “epistemology without a knowing subject”. The
latter especially was very influential in my understanding of what we now call a
philosophy of information. It is easy to see this in my admittedly qualified support
for Mark Notturno’s interpretation, according to which “Popper’s concept of
subjectless knowledge is a legitimate use of the word ‘knowledge’. It corresponds
to the sense of ‘knowledge’ as information or a branch of learning [my emphasis]”
(Notturno 1985, p. 153). In short, Gillies is absolutely spot on in his analysis of my
work. There is more that we share. Both of us are mathematical realists, like Frege
was, even if our Greek alliances differ. As he writes
I am completely in agreement with Floridi that we should regard information as
real, and that philosophers should try to elaborate a theory of informational realism.
However, I differ from him in preferring a different version of informational
realism. This version, as we shall see, is more Aristotelian than Platonic.
I shall not try to convince the reader that Plato is better than Aristotle, though you
might guess that I prefer to sit with Whitehead when it comes to interpreting Western
philosophy. What I shall try to do instead is to highlight two concepts—structure
and interaction—which I believe should play a key role in an informational-theoretic
philosophy of mathematical structuralism, independently of whether you prefer
Gillies’ Aristotelianism to my Platonism.
Structures have been increasingly important in the history and the philosophy of
mathematics. Understood as systematic patterns of differences—like a black circle
on a white surface, the set of all points whose Cartesian coordinates satisfy the
equation x2 þ y2 ¼ 22, thus identifying a circle of radius 2, or the set of natural
numbers—structures shift our ontological focus, from the substantial nature of
mathematical entities as things, to their underlining relational essence as patterns.
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This is a crucial lesson I believe I learnt from Cassirer and his masterly essay
dedicated to the replacement of the concept of substance by that of function in the
philosophy of mathematics (1910, now Cassirer 1953). Just a decade before its
publication, Hilbert had elegantly and famously explained such structuralism at the
beginning of his Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899, see now Hilbert 1971):
We think of these points, straight lines, and planes [in Geometry] as having
certain mutual relations, which we indicate by means of such words as ‘are
situated,’ ‘between,’ ‘parallel,’ ‘congruent,’ ‘continuous,’ etc. The complete
and exact description of these relations follows as a consequence of the axioms
of geometry. These axioms may be arranged in five groups. Each of these
groups expresses, by itself, certain related fundamental facts of our intuition.
Replace in the quotation “as having certain mutual relations” with “as being
constituted by certain mutual relations”, and you obtain a structuralist ontology of
geometrical elements. A similar analysis can be provided for arithmetical structures.
Mathematical as well as physical objects are what we, as specific informational
structures (cognitive systems, in an equivalent vocabulary), find easier to handle
logically, mentally and empirically. However, there are good philosophical, mathe-
matical and scientific reasons (Floridi 2008b, 2010b; Shapiro 2000; French and
Ladyman 2003) to commit ourselves to a structuralist/informationalist ontology
according to which mathematical as well as physical objects do not play the role of
ultimate realia. Like icons on a computer screen, they are user-friendly, but they should
not be confused with what lies behind them and constitutes their nature. Recall that we
are, to the best of our knowledge, the only semantically structuring structures in the
infosphere (see my reply to Durante). As such, we give and make sense of what we
experience by objectifying it. The distance from the world that makes a rich cognitive
life possible is also the price imposed by the reification of the world. We freeze changes
into state- or phase-transitions and modular events and transform patterns and structures
into objects and properties, finally privileging a naïve ontology of sufficiently
permanent things and qualities. How many times have you heard philosophers using
the expression “the furniture of the world”? We deal with Being by forgetting the -ing
part. This is fine, as long as the task is to survive and reproduce in a hostile
environment, which promotes fast reactions and punishes slow reflection, but it is much
less satisfactory if the goal is to understand the ultimate nature of reality philosophically.
From this unifying perspective, it is reasonable to presume that we are always dealing
with dynamic structures, whether empirically or mathematically reified as objects, so
mathematical structures are not second-class citizens of our ontology, with first-class
citizens represented by material things, the usual chairs and horses, kicked stones and
white snow, co-referential stars, chariots and trolleys, hammers and thalers and so forth.
The sketch I have just provided is in line with what Shapiro (1997) has defined
and defended as the ante rem approach to mathematical structuralism. The difference
is that the whole ontology is ante rem, not just the ontology of mathematical objects.
At the same time, Gillies’ position is consistent with Shapiro’s characterization of
Aristotelian, in re mathematical structuralism. In both cases, an informational
approach to structuralism helps to prevent (rather than solve) the problem of why
mathematics is so readily applicable to the empirical world: it is a question of
structures all the way down.
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Let me now turn to the concept of interaction. Mathematical structures interplay
and interlock with each other in various ways. Such internal interactions (Hilbert’s
more static “certain mutual relations”) are what an informational structural realist
qualifies as primarily necessary, not the mathematical objects that they end up
constituting. Yet interactive is also our relationship with such mathematical
structures. As Gillies rightly remarks, I have argued that such external interactions
give us a metaphysical criterion of existence (a yardstick to check whether x exists,
not what it means for x to exist, or what kind of existence x enjoys). To put it simply,
ghosts do not exist not because you cannot touch them, but because there is no Level
of Abstraction at which you can interact with them. That is why subatomic particles
exist and so do non-Euclidean triangles, even if you cannot touch or smell them.
True, whether and how we can interact with certain mathematical structures depends
on the adopted Level of Abstraction (LoA). You may not consider functions of the
kind xy among your observables, or once they are admitted by your LoA, you may
work with them differently, depending on whether you make the x and the y range
only on the natural numbers (so that, for example, you obtain 32=9) or on the
integers as well (so that 3−2=1/32). This is where Gillies and I are still in agreement.
But once the observables are admitted and specified, their dynamics is a matter of
acknowledgement and discovery, not construction or invention. This is where I take
a more Platonist route.
Let me close my comment with an anecdote. One day, when I was a boy, my mother
found me distressed because I had just read about the death of Porthos, one of the four
musketeers, in Dumas’ The Man in the Iron Mask (1847–1850, now Dumas 2008).
There was not much she could do, but she tried to console me by pointing out that I
was not alone: Dumas himself had been deeply upset by the death of his character.
She recounted the story according to which Dumas cried for days because Porthos
was dead. This seemed to me perfectly reasonable, but what struck me at the time
and made me forget my sadness was the alleged explanation that Dumas offered
when asked why he, the omnipotent author, could not change the story of a literary
character. He said that Porthos had to die. That seemed to me to express better than
anything else I had experienced at the time the force of a theorem, the strength of
logical coherence, the inescapable, constraining grip of structures, which have
features and interact in ways that are utterly independent of our wills and desires.
Dumas was powerless. Porthos’ death was the inexorable conclusion, given the
development of the plot. That evening I thanked my mother for the lesson in logical
thinking and felt a bit less upset: necessity is somewhat soothing. Many years later,
while writing this reply, I went to check the episode. It still saddens me. But I found
a line that seems very appropriate to conclude this short comment. “‘Parbleu!’ said
Porthos again, with laughter that he did not even attempt to restrain, ‘when a thing is
explained to me I understand it; begone, and give me the light’”.
3 Reply to Allo
The paper by Allo is most insightful and ingenious. Insightful because it correctly
interprets the theory of strongly semantic information, the task it is supposed to discharge
with respect to the Bar-Hillel-Carnal paradox and its Tarskian root: contradictions pose
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an informational problem because of their truth value, not because of their inferential
effects. Ingenious, because it convincingly shows how the veridicality thesis (for P to
qualify as semantic information, P must be true) might be (made) compatible with
dialetheism (there are true contradictions, so for some P, both P and ¬P are true). Since
I am not a dialetheist myself, I will not need to follow Allo in that direction, but it is
interesting to see what would happen if one day I were to change my philosophy of
logic. Instead, what I would like to do, in the rest of this reply, is to expand on a
specific point made by Allo in his paper.
Suppose we might be allowed to play the role of minor gods. We are not just
observers of the world, but also makers of it. Let us call the world we are building
the system and the output of the observation of such world its model. The system is
completely transparent to us, who have engineered it, but rather opaque to its users.
The world system is made of many other sub-systems. One of them is a vending
machine: we, the gods, know exactly what goes on inside it, whereas the user can
only rely on a simple interface (Level of Abstraction, or simply LoA) to understand
and operate it. Could there be “contradictions” inside the system? If we are poor
engineers or rather clumsy gods, the answer is obviously yes. This is not a matter of
category mistake: if some parts A of the vending machine click and clang to the
effect that state D arises (the machine dispenses the soft drink), while some other
parts B of the same system simultaneously move and change to the effect that
opposite state ¬D also arises (the machine does not dispense the soft drink) at the
same time as D, then the physical clash—what conceptually, or in terms of design, is
described as a logical inconsistency—between D and ¬D will arise and cause a
mess: users not getting their drinks when they should or perhaps getting them
randomly or getting more than they paid for. Clearly, actual contradictory processes
or events or patterns or facts or features of entities (depending on one’s own
ontology) may be presupposed to occur in the world. Metaphysical dialetheism is
perfectly conceivable from a God’s (sorry, gods’) eye perspective. The observer,
however, placed on this epistemological side (the mortal one) of the LoA, will
experience the malfunctioning of the system—e.g. the delivery of no cans, or the
delivery of more cans than she is entitled to—not the contradictory double-functioning
(both A and B) that is causing the malfunctioning, that is, she will not experience the
machine dispensing and not dispensing the purchased drink at the same time and in
the same sense. The example should clarify that wondering whether the world might
contain contradictions means wondering whether it is feasible and sensible to adopt a
LoA at which some of the states of the world-system are described by the resulting
model as the upshot of contradictions intrinsic to the system.
Let us return to our vending machine. Suppose that it is working perfectly well but
that the user develops an inconsistent model of it and its behaviour. She represents the
machine as simultaneously dispensing and not dispensing the right drink for the same
correct amount of money, in exactly the plain sense in which you and I understand
such contradiction. In other words, her model states that both P and ¬P are true of the
targeted system. If asked, she might explain why she gets the right drink every time
she inserts the right coins as a case of amazing good luck. In this case, the
contradiction is in the model, not in the system. Strictly speaking, as Allo correctly
remarks: “there is no reason to assume that the constraints imposed by the world are
such that only consistent models are possible”. It would be wonderful if the opposite
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were the case. Unfortunately, semantic dialetheism is not only perfectly possible, but
probably the norm, given how difficult it is to spot inconsistencies in our ways of
handling the world informationally. This point is painfully driven home when we shift
our perspective, and instead of talking of contradictory observing models—which
requires some conceptual gymnastic, as we have just seen—we concentrate on
contradictory blueprints, those models that specify the overall design of the systems to
be built. Too often contradictory requirements and specifications lead to malfunctioning
and even dangerous systems. We expend too much effort and resources debugging and
trying to make sure that blueprints are at least internally consistent to have any doubts
about the everyday phenomenon of semantic dialetheism.
Contradictory artefacts resulting from contradictory blueprints need not consist of
physical bits or digital bytes. They might be social or intellectual constructs as well.
Legislation, political institutions or social practices may easily be contradictory, for
example. This not only reinforces the view that metaphysical dialetheism is far from
being a mere speculation, but it also shows how metaphysical and semantic
dialetheism, both viable as independent options, may be combined into a single form
of absolute dialetheism. Hegel and Marx were keen on explaining contradictory
(social, intellectual, political, economic, engineered and so forth) systems in terms of
models capable of handling contradictory descriptions of them.
Does all this mean that, after all, I should change my philosophy of logic and
embrace a more contradictory-friendly attitude when it comes to the nature of
information? It has taken some elaboration, but explaining why the answer is in the
negative was the point I said I wished to highlight in Allo’s paper. On several
occasions, Allo refers to pragmatic considerations lying behind the assumption of
consistency (and hence the rejection of dialetheism), but he also seems to dismiss
them as merely practical, while the method of levels of abstraction is interpreted
exclusively in epistemological terms (roughly, the models are always descriptions,
never blueprints). This is where I am less willing to follow Allo’s approach. For
example, he is right in highlighting
what the costs of an overall consistent approach are. In brief: we cannot appeal
to the consistency of the world, and we should be aware of the overall cost of
maintaining consistency.
But the pragmatic dimension of our construction of our models of the world is
crucial and cannot be left out or underestimated as merely contextual, because it is
there that the previous costs are counterbalanced by overwhelming benefits. We seek
and value semantic information not just because we wish to pursue the epistemic
goals of description, explanation and prediction, but also, if not probably mainly,
because we want to interact with the world and build it or modify it successfully. It is
the pragmatic dimension provided by the goals of interaction, construction and
modification that grants to the virtue of consistency of our models a normative,
overriding value that would otherwise make consistency appear to be on a par with
other virtues (thus consistency and elegance, for example, are not on the same plane).
It does so in two ways. Interactively, being told that one is and is not a vegetarian will
not help pragmatically the chef who needs to provide an appropriate meal, exactly in
the same way and sense in which being told that one is or is not a vegetarian leaves
things unimproved informatively. Recall the Tarskian point above: in information
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transactions, consistency is to be sought because without it there is no useful
transaction, and not because any transactions will ensue. Constructively, a blueprint
of a vending machine does not have to have the virtues of being elegant or simple or
parsimonious, but it must be devoid of contradictory features, or the resulting
artefact will malfunction. The same applies to a piece of legislation, a computer
program or the safety system of a nuclear power station. Consistency is a necessary
condition for well-functioning. This pragmatic feature cannot be overvalued. That is
why in both cases (i.e. interactively and constructively), we should adopt levels of
abstraction that generate consistent models.
To conclude, there are three informational contexts where consistency plays a
crucial role: in (what we take it to be) the nature of the world (the system), in how
we describe it (the model) and in how we go about engaging with it (the praxis). The
difference that information makes is not only epistemic (affecting only the system
and its model), it is also, if not primarily, pragmatic (affecting also the praxis) and
consistency serves both masters. This is “the separate reason to reject expressive
completeness”, as Allo writes, or to put it simply, this is why inconsistent
information might make sense descriptively but has no value normatively.
4 Reply to Adriaans
There is a fundamental disagreement between Adriaans and myself. Allow me to
explain it with an analogy. Adriaans seems to think that a football game is best and
indeed completely understood in terms of Newtonian physics. In contrast, I argue
that Newtonian physics is insufficient and that you also, and more importantly, need
to understand the meaning (semantics) of the game as well (strategies and
calculations, history and psychology and so forth), or you will make little sense of
it. Newtonian physics places some firm and inevitable constraints on any physical
game but, from its perspective, there is no difference between Wimbledon and the
World Cup. For this reason, one needs to keep the negative constraints satisfied but
then move on and exercise semantic acumen in order to understand and explain the
phenomenon in question. Following this analogy, you might imagine my
astonishment when I saw myself caricatured in the article as if I had ever argued
that information theory is neither necessary nor sufficient to develop our
philosophical understanding of information and its related phenomena. The double
negation is obviously nonsensical, I never held it, and I am not sure indulging in
punching such a straw man is worthwhile. The actual view that I have defended is
that information theory provides the scientific constraints within which we can
develop an interesting philosophy of information. So I have argued for its necessity
but against its sufficiency. Without information theory, there is no PI, but PI is much
more than information theory on steroids. I foolishly thought the point was not only
obvious enough, but also uncontroversial. Adriaans made me realise my mistake.
Given such fundamental disagreement, I shall restrain from commenting on the
article’s proposal. It belongs to an old-fashioned, perfectly respectable but also
bankrupted tradition of attempting to squeeze semantics out of syntax. Using the
previous analogy: the hope is that if you add enough physical rules and formulae,
you will understand football one day. What I might stress is that the failure of such
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an approach in the specific field of artificial intelligence has indeed caused me to
take the semantic road that Adriaans finds so unappealing. It is not a road without
serious intellectual challenges, but there is a significant difference between knowing
that one approach is futile—namely, trying to develop a philosophy of information
on the exclusive basis of mathematical results obtained from information theory—
and having reason to believe that a different approach might be fruitful, namely,
developing a philosophy of information semantically richer. This leads me to the
valuable remark on my work that one encounters in the article: “Floridi’s efforts
belong in [sic] the transcendental program”. It might not be a deep insight, but it is
an absolutely correct one. For I explicitly acknowledged in the introduction of
Floridi (2010b) that “[this] is also a German book, written from a post-analytic-
continental divide perspective, more Kantian than I ever expected it to be”.
As for the rest of the article, its style and content unfortunately deprive it of most of
its potential philosophical value. Imagine if I were to juxtapose the following two
sentences lifted from the article: (1) “information theory has succeeded in formulating
a mathematically sound solution to the general induction problem” and (2) “The quote
above are typical for his style of presentation in which perfectly defendable positions
are interleaved with fairly radical statements that are hard to interpret in a sensible
way.”Wouldn’t this be just evidence of poor scholarship? My recommendation to the
reader is to render unto the scientists the problems which are scientific, namely those
which are empirico-mathematically solvable at least in principle, and unto the
philosophers the problems that are philosophical, namely those which are intrinsically
open, i.e. forever subject to well-informed and rational disagreement, even in
principle. A careful blend of information theory and philosophy of information is
more than just welcome; it is necessary if we wish to understand the complicated
world in which we live. But confusing one with the other and randomly mixing bits of
Shannon with bits of Heidegger is only a recipe for disaster.
5 Reply to Ganascia
I agree with much that Ganascia argues in his article. In particular, his interpretation
of AI as a discipline with two souls is both correct and refreshing. Let me comment
on the correctness first.
It is a well-known fact, although sometimes underestimated, that AI research
seeks both to reproduce the outcome of our intelligent behaviour by non-biological
means and to produce the non-biological equivalent of our intelligence. On the one
hand, as a branch of engineering interested in intelligent behaviour reproduction, AI
has been incredibly successful, well beyond the rosiest expectations. Nowadays, we
increasingly rely on AI-related applications (so-called smart artefacts) to perform
tasks that would be simply impossible by un-aided or un-augmented human
intelligence. Reproductive AI regularly outperforms and replaces human intelligence
in an ever-larger number of contexts. Next time you experience a bumpy landing
recall that that is probably because the pilot was in charge, not the computer. On the
other hand, as a branch of cognitive science interested in intelligence production, AI
has been a dismal disappointment. Current machines have the intelligence of a
toaster, and we really haven’t got much of a clue about how to move from there
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(Floridi et al. 2009). Productive AI does not merely underperform with respect to
human intelligence; it has not joined the competition yet.
Edsger Wybe Dijkstra’s famous comment that “the question of whether a
computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine
can swim” is indicative of the applied approach shared by reproductive AI. John
McCarthy’s disappointed comments about Deep Blue’s victory against Kasparov are
symptomatic of the sort of productive AI which frowns upon reproductive AI. The
two souls of AI have often engaged in fratricidal feuds for intellectual predominance
and financial resources. That is partly because they both claim common ancestors
and a single intellectual inheritance: Turing, his machine with its computational
limits, and then his famous test, and the fact that a simulation might be used in order
to check both whether the simulated source has been produced and whether the
targeted source’s behaviour or performance has been reproduced or even surpassed.
The two souls have been variously named, and sometimes the distinctions weak vs.
strong AI or, as Ganascia reminds us, Good-Old Fashioned vs. New or Nouvelle AI,
have been used to capture the difference. I prefer to use the less loaded distinction
between light vs. strong AI (Floridi 1999). The misalignment of their goals and
results has caused endless and most pointless diatribes. Defenders of AI point to the
strong results of reproductive AI, which is really weak or light AI in terms of goals,
whereas detractors of AI point to the weak results of productive AI, which is really
strong AI in terms of goals. It is here that Ganascia’s paper is refreshing, and this is
my second comment.
Ganascia seeks to escape the dichotomy outlined above by defending the view
that AI cannot be reduced to a “science of nature” nor to a “science of culture”,
because it is what he calls, following Rickert, an “intermediary domain”, a science of
the artificial, to put it with Simon (1996). The interactions between such sciences,
their purposes and logics are a fascinating topic, which deserves further study. Here,
I shall limit myself to calling the reader’s attention to one specific issue raised by
Ganascia: the relationship between artefacts, their users and the environment in
which they interact.
Ganascia points out that the alleged limits of AI are “not caused by the
oversimplification of AI models, like many people pretend nowadays, but by their
inadequacy to the ‘outer’ environment”. I will not develop the objection that one
way of explaining why AI applications fail, when they do, is exactly because they
are based on oversimplifications. Although failing to cope successfully with one’s
environment is one way of defining stupidity, there might be other reasons as well.
What interests me here is to highlight a risk that might also be an opportunity.
Consider the following parody. Two people A and H are married, and they really
wish to make their relationship work, but A, who does increasingly more in the house,
is inflexible, stubborn, intolerant of mistakes and unlikely to change, whereas H is just
the opposite but is also becoming progressively lazier and dependent on A. The result
is an unbalanced environment, in which A ends up shaping the relationship and
distorting H’s behaviours, practically, if not purposefully. If the marriage works, that is
because it is carefully tailored around A. Now, consider AI technologies as an instance
of Information and Communications Technologies. I have argued that one of their
philosophically interesting features is that they re-ontologise (i.e. modify the very
essence of) the physical and conceptual environments in which they operate (Floridi
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2007). They play the role of A in the previous analogy, whereas their human users
are clearly H. So the risk we are running is that our technologies might shape our
physical and conceptual environments and make us adjust to them because that is the
best, or sometimes the only, way to make things work. After all, since AI is the
stupid but laborious spouse and humanity the intelligent but lazy one, who is going
to adapt to whom, if a divorce is not an option? The reader will probably recall many
episodes in real life when something could not be done or had to be done in a very
cumbersome or silly way because that was the only way to make the computerised
system do what it had to do. Here is a more concrete, trivial example (philosophically,
things are way more complex). The risk is that we might end up building houses with
round walls and furniture with sufficiently high legs in order to fit the capacities of a
Roomba (http://www.irobot.com/) much more effectively. I certainly wish our house
were more Roomba-friendly. The example is useful to illustrate not only the risk but
also the opportunity represented by AI’s re-ontologising power.
There are many “roundy” places in which we live, from igloos to medieval towers
and from bow windows to public buildings where corners of the rooms are rounded
for sanitary reasons. If we spend most of our time inside squarish boxes that is
because of another set of technologies related to the mass production of bricks and
concrete infrastructures and the ease of straight cuts of building material. It is the
mechanical circular saw that, paradoxically, generates a right-angled world. In both
cases, squarish and roundy places have been built following the predominant
technologies, rather than through the choices of their potential inhabitants. Following
this example, it is easy to see how the opportunity represented by AI’s re-
ontologising power comes in three forms: rejection, critical acceptance and proactive
design. By becoming more critically aware of the re-ontologising power of AI and
ICT in general, we might be able to avoid the worst forms of distortion (rejection) or
at least be consciously tolerant of them (acceptance), especially when it does not
matter (consider the Roomba-friendly length of the legs of the furniture) or when this
is a temporary solution while waiting for a better design. In the latter case, being able
to imagine what the future will be like and what adaptive demands technologies will
place on their human users may help to devise technological solutions that can lower
their anthropological costs. In short, intelligent design should play a major role in
shaping the future of our interactions with forthcoming technological artefacts. After
all, it is a sign of intelligence to make stupidity work for you.
6 Reply to Piazza
I enjoyed Piazza’s article. It is not only well-informed, but also analytically
discerning about some of the less obvious features of my epistemological proposal.
Of its many valuable contributions to the current debate on the possibility of
analysing knowledge as accounted information, one seems to me to be of particular
value. I may introduce it by quoting Piazza himself:
No less clearly, however, the considerations above also face Floridi’s account
with a potential difficulty, as they seem to sustain a reasonable doubt about the
very viability of this strategy: if one believes that knowledge can be acquired
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through perception, or by testimony, and one also believes that in those cases
there is no accounting or explaining information which could explain the
epistemic status to which it is upgraded, one could well be tempted to suggest
that knowledge could not, at least not in general, be analysed as accounted
information; for at least in the cases just envisaged, an explanation of it will
have to proceed by taking into account the justificatory role which perception
and testimony seem to perform (italics added).
I believe Piazza to be mostly right but perhaps in a way that may not entirely
satisfy him, for his premises can be accepted, indeed strengthened, without accepting
his conclusion. Let me explain why.
All the empirical information about the world that we enjoy flows and keeps
flowing to us through our senses: directly, through our perception of the world, and
indirectly, through our perception of other epistemic agents’ perception of the world.
We either saw it or read it somewhere, to put it simply, if slightly incorrectly (for we
might have heard it or tasted it, and reading after all is also a case of seeing etc., but
you get the picture). Thus, Aristotelians and Empiricists of various schools are
largely correct in holding that nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.
“Nothing is in the understanding that was not earlier in the senses”, if and only if
(the biconditional qualifies the “largely” above) what we are talking about is
empirical information about the external world. If we then distinguish the direct and
the indirect perception of the world by referring to the former as simply perception,
the first-hand testimony of our senses, and to the latter as testimony, the second-hand
perception by proxy, we see immediately that Piazza’s article concerns the only two
sources of empirical information available to cognitive agents like us. It is therefore
essential to check how far his criticism might be justified.
Let me first clear the ground of a potential misunderstanding. Knowledge and
information states and processes are sufficiently similar to be interchangeable in most
daily circumstances, without any significant loss either in communication or in pragmatic
efficacy. This fact reminds us that some tolerance in our semantics might be accepted
sensibly. There is an imprecise but still reasonable sense in which, if you see that such
and such is the case, then you hold the information that such and such is the case, and ipso
facto you know that such and such is the case. Thus, if you see a yellow light flashing,
then you know that there is a yellow light flashing in front of you. The same holds true
for testimony: if you are told by someone, who saw a yellow light flashing, that there
was a yellow light flashing, then you know that there was a yellow light flashing.
The value of such mundane equation—perceiving well-formed, meaningful and
truthful data amounting to p is equal to being informed that p, which is equal to
knowing that p—is that we gain much simplicity. The cost is that we lose the
possibility of drawing some conceptual distinctions, which become essential once
we wish to be precise in our epistemology. This is why some philosophers, including
myself, resist such deflationism. The reluctance is due not only to the cost to be paid,
but to the fact that such cost is philosophically unaffordable once we realise that
knowledge is a specific kind of information, the kind enriched by the capacity of
answering relevant questions about p, that about which one is informed.
Perception and testimony may be analysed along the same line because—in the
best (i.e. non-Gettierised, scepticism-free, error-free, Floridi (2004)) circumstances—
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they both convey information about their specific references: they are our
information providers. Let us consider perception first.
Epistemologically, our bodies are our interfaces with the world. Their sensory
apparatus implements hard-wired levels of abstraction (more technically, we are
embodied gradients of abstraction), which determine the range and type of
observable data that can be acquired. Perception is then a general term that refers
to the process of data input through which epistemic agents like us acquire first-hand
data about their environment at the levels of abstraction offered by their bodies. Such
process of data input is fallible, but it can be corrected, enhanced (e.g. through a pair
of glasses) and augmented (e.g. through a telescope). By itself, such a first-hand,
data-gathering process may be considered a case of knowledge acquisition, but then
any elementary signal-processing gadget would qualify as a cognitive agent, and this
seems to be a bullet not worth biting. Let me explain. In some circumstances, we are
not much better off than the aforementioned gadget. You see a yellow light flashing
on the panel of your dishwasher at home. Suppose you haven’t got a clue about what
it might mean. At this stage, all you have acquired, through such perception, is at
most the information concerning the light flashing. If you have further background
information, e.g. about the covariance between the yellow light flashing and the
dishwasher having run out of salt, then, by perceiving the light flashing, you may
also acquire that further bit of information about the low level of salt. All this is
uncontroversial. What is notoriously open to debate is whether such perception, by
itself, may amount to more than information-gathering at best. I hold that, if we wish
to be epistemologically accurate, it does not. It is not enough to perceive a yellow
light flashing to know that there is a yellow light flashing in front of you, not just
because a whole set of complex concepts must already be at play (light, yellow,
flashing, the fact that lights can flash, that flashing lights of any colour on the panel
of a white good are normally not decorative features but signals, that, as signals,
lights off are less indicative than lights being on, that lights might not work properly
but a flashing light is normally working well and it is meant to be intermittent, etc.),
but equally importantly, because the perceptual data input (to simplify, there is a
yellow light flashing there), plus the conceptual framework (the yellow light flashing
there means…) required to formulate and make sense of it, further demands an
explanation in order to graduate from information to the higher status of knowledge.
In other words, unless you are able to answer a whole series of “how come”
questions—how come that the light is flashing? How come that it is the yellow light
and not another light that it is flashing? How come that the light is yellow? etc.—
your status is no better than that of a dishwasher manual, where we can read that
“the yellow light flashing indicates that the dishwasher has run out of salt”. In other
words, we would like knowledge to pass the Phaedrus’ test.1
1 [Socrates]: Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of
painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it
is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them,
wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing [they are unary devices,
in our terminology]. And every word, when [275e] once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those
who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak;
when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or
help itself.
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Let us now turn to testimony. This is the process through which epistemic agents like
us transfer information to each other. Note that testimony does not generate
information: the GIGO (garbage in garbage out) rule applies. If you tell me that p,
e.g. that the dishwasher’s yellow light was flashing yesterday, then, at most, I now
hold the information that p. Unless we quietly presuppose that the receiver of p is
doing more than just receiving and registering p—e.g. that the receiver is also
evaluating the reliability of the source of p, but then this “more” is where a theory
of account is hiding—all we have, at the end of a testimony process, is the transfer
of some information from the original source to the final target, through a network of
senders and receivers. The best that can happen is that the informational baton is
passed through the several nodes that are relaying it without being lost. Luckily for
us, testimony is not a Boolean process, the network is resilient—nodes can
implement information correction procedures (as when a later epistemic agent
recovers or reconstruct what was the original information and relays it in its
corrected, restored format)—and there is often plenty of redundancy—as when
several people act as independent sources, conveying the same information about the
same event or repeatedly sending the same information at different times and
through different channels (your wife tells you that the yellow light was flashing, and
so does your daughter). Still, this is information transfer, not yet information (let
alone knowledge) generation. Receiving p can hardly amount to knowing that p,
for knowledge requires more than true content or, which is equivalent, well-
formed, meaningful and truthful data. If this were not the case, any database would
be very knowledgeable indeed, and all medieval scribes who copied Greek
manuscripts without speaking much Greek at all would have been very learned. In
other words, we would like knowledge to pass the parrot test (Descartes’ Discourse
on the Method): given that the yellow light was indeed flashing, being told,
correctly, by a well-trained parrot that the yellow light was flashing while we were
not in the kitchen does not seem to ensure that we know that the yellow light was
flashing. At most, we have acquired that bit of information. If we do not do
anything with it, that is all the epistemic dividends we may enjoy.
Let us now put the two threads together. Perception generates data about the
world, which need to be interpreted to become information. It does not generate
knowledge yet. Testimony transfers information (also but not only) about the world
but does not yet generate knowledge. In both cases, what is missing, in order to gain
empirical knowledge of the world in a precise epistemological sense, is the
explanation of the empirical information acquired. Such explanation is obtained
through the intelligent accounting of the available information. This is what I have
argued in Floridi (2010b).
Time to return to Piazza’s criticism. Piazza is right in stating that (first premise)
“knowledge can be acquired through perception, or by testimony”, as long as
“acquire” is understood, as it should, as stating necessary but not yet sufficient
conditions. Compare this to “x (a mortgage, a passport, a skill, etc.) can be acquired
through y (a credit evaluation, a full application, the relevant training, etc.)”. Indeed,
in this sense, I have argued for a stronger thesis: empirical knowledge can be
acquired only through perception or by testimony. If one day we will be able to
implant Wiki-microchips under the skin, it will still be a case of testimony. Piazza is
also right in stating that (second premise) “in those cases [perception and testimony]
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there is no accounting or explaining information which could explain the epistemic
status to which it is upgraded”, if we understand by this that unaccounted perception
or testimony does not qualify yet as knowledge. Where he seems to be mistaken is in
drawing the following conclusion from the previous two premises: “one could well
be tempted to suggest that knowledge could not, at least not in general, be analysed
as accounted information”. Nobody who understands the previous two premises
should be tempted to jump to such conclusion. He adds that “for at least in the cases
just envisaged, an explanation of it will have to proceed by taking into account the
justificatory role which perception and testimony seem to perform”. So perhaps the
problem lies with the devilish concept of justification. There are at least two ways in
which seeing that such and such is the case justifies the seer to hold that such and
such is the case. One is by interpreting the justification in terms of causality.
Reliabilist theories used to like this approach. It seems impossible to disagree with
this interpretation: it is the visual process of data-input that causally makes possible
the acquisition of the relevant bits of information about the yellow light flashing. But
causality is not what is being invoked here, since we are not looking for a descriptive
account, but for a normative one. So the alternative is to use justification to mean
exculpation. This, however, adds nothing to our or the seer’s understanding of the
case in question, even if it does add a note on the epistemic conduct of the agent in
question. He did not dream it nor imagine it; he did not project it out of fear nor
carelessly assumed it: he saw a yellow light flashing, eyes wide-open, double-
checking, changing angle and perspective. He really did his best to make sure that he
saw a yellow light flashing. He did the right thing. The verdict is causally sound and
epistemologically not guilty. Yet all this is irrelevant to the epistemic state of such
agent. As I have argued above and much more extensively and in detail in Floridi
(2010b), being right about p and having done everything reasonably possible to
avoid being wrong about p do not yet mean that one knows that p. For a knower is
“the man who knows how to ask and answer questions” (Plato, Cratylus, 390c),
giving an account, that is.
7 Reply to Flavio Soares Correa da Silva
The perceptive article by Flavio Soares Correa da Silva provides original insights
into a very interesting area of potential development of the philosophy of
information, one to which I hope I may dedicate much more attention in the future,
namely political philosophy. In this context, I would like to highlight two interesting
contributions offered by Correa da Silva.
First, the article does a remarkable job in interlacing three distinct threads in my
research on the philosophy of information, in order to form the original fabric of
appropriate guidelines for the development of successful programmes for electronic
government: (1) a modal logic for the formalisation of the notion of being informed;
(2) Information Ethics and (3) the analysis of current trends in the development of
the Web. Second, the article introduces the concept of “public moral agents”, and
this is certainly worth all our attention. Correa da Silva defines a “public moral
agent” as “a moral agent whose actions are, by definition and construction, fully
accountable by third party”. This is already very interesting, but the really important
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aspect is that he is able to include, in the same class of public moral agents, a whole
variety of digital artefacts, engineered robots, social institutions and human organ-
isations. Given the right level of abstraction, a piece of software, a drone, a state
department and a company are human constructs which may (have to) obey the same
general rules of design and ethical evaluation. Correa da Silva offers then a convincing
case in favour of an evaluation of the construction, development and regulations of such
agents in light of Information Ethics, with the goal of sustaining increasingly better
forms of electronic government. He and I share the same cautious optimism about such
potentialities. The article opens up many interesting lines of research. It is to be hoped
that at least some of them will be pursued in the future. It is a practical goal that deserves
to be taken as seriously as possible (see Briggle and Mitcham 2009).
8 Reply to Brenner
The article develops an independent line of research, fully articulated in Brenner
(2008), whose evaluation would require much more space than I have at my disposal
here. So I shall limit myself to highlight, as briefly as possible, two simple points.
First, I am grateful to Brenner for providing a very reliable analysis of the work
on Information Ethics that I have developed in the course of the past 10 years or so,
with great accuracy and remarkable discernment. His scholarship is exemplary. As
an example, I would like to offer the following comment:
If we follow Introna’s division of approaches to the ethical implications of
information technology into phenomenological, artefact/tool and social
constructivist, I place Floridi’s views in primarily the artefact/tool category,
as his ethics analyzes the impact of technology on practices by applying a new
moral theory to that can construct ‘guidelines or policies’ that may help correct
injustices or potential infringements of rights resulting from the use of a
technology. This is not to say that Floridi does not believe technology and
society co-constitute or co-construct each other, but that one should start by
focusing on the underlying (informational) characteristics of the technology.
Second, it is interesting to see how, despite the fact that Brenner comes from a
very different perspective and tradition (he seems to be working within the
dialetheist framework also discussed by Patrick Allo, see my reply to the latter),
his position appears to be fruitfully compatible and synergetic with respect to some
of the conclusions I have reached on the philosophy of information (Floridi 2010b).
As Brenner acknowledges, much work still needs to be done, and many challenges
have not been met yet, but optimism does not seem to be out of place.
9 Reply to Byron
The following quotation seems to summarise well the paper by Byron: “once we
grant that Floridi is right about the fourth revolution, the interesting issue becomes
how we think about human nature”. This is exactly what I have been arguing for
some time. However, once this essential step is made, two further points of
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significant importance distinguish Byron’s position from mine: what the fourth
revolution consists in and whether Information Ethics might help us to think more
adequately about ethical issues brought about by the fourth revolution.
Regarding the first point, it is evident that in the article Byron attaches much (I fear
too much) importance to the phenomenon of Artificial Companions (AC). It might be
my fault, since, in the work primarily discussed by Byron, I relied quite extensively on
AC as a good example of the sort of novelties that we shall be witnessing within the
context of the fourth revolution. However, it was never my intention to associate the
fourth revolution with some kind of breakthrough in artificial intelligence or human
genetics. It seems a mistake to envision such a discontinuity with the previous three
revolutions. For if the fourth revolution hypothesis has any hermeneutic value at all,
this lies in the fact that, like the first three, computer science and its applications are
making us experience a radical change in how we appreciate our own nature, our place
in the universe and our potential responsibilities in it. What we rightly feel to be an
extraordinary time in the history of humanity—brought about by amazing computa-
tional advancements and corresponding mind-blowing technologies—seems hardly
explainable merely in terms of unprecedented types and scopes of interactions with the
world and their pervasiveness. Such revolution makes much more sense once it is
interpreted as a radical shift in our philosophical anthropology. Thus, the fourth
revolution is more about social networks today than about futuristic robots. Yes, the
capacity of building smart machines that one day might imitate humans so well as to
become largely (and perhaps wilfully, on our side) indistinguishable from their human
counterparts is indeed part of the fourth revolution (see my reply to Ganascia), but not,
simplistically, because we shall be dealing with humanoid agents whose moral status
will pose ethical issues. I strongly doubt that anyone well acquainted with the current
and foreseeable status of our computer science and AI may take such concern very
seriously (on the discussion of a “Floridi test” for AI see Bringsjord 2010). Even
assuming a similar scenario were not science fiction, features such as having a mental
life, enjoying semantic capacities and possessing intellectual abilities are already more
than sufficient to render any speculation about the moral responsibilities of future
artificial agents not merely idle, but dangerously distracting from the actual
challenges we will effectively encounter. So the fourth revolution is not about
future anthopominded robots, although increasingly smart artefacts do cast a new
light on our self-understanding. And it is not about the future of human cyborgs
either. In this case, too, the possibility of fanciful post-human IT-enabled or IT-
enhanced beings, whether genetically or prosthetically, should be appreciated,
philosophically, as the symptom of a deeper transformation in the way in which we
are reassessing our nature. The very fact that we can think coherently about such
future humanity shows that something deeper in our self-conception is being revised
silently. We are not immobile, at the centre of the universe (Copernicus), we are not
unnaturally detached and diverse from the rest of the animal world (Darwin) and we
are not Cartesian subjects entirely transparent to ourselves (Freud). We are currently
coming to terms with the possibility that we might not be disconnected and stand-
alone material entities, but rather informational organisms, not unlike other
biological agents and engineered artefacts, with which we share a global
environment ultimately made of information, the infosphere (Turing). This is the
fourth revolution.
268 L. Floridi
Regarding the second point, according to Byron the Information Ethics that I have
defended fails to provide a fruitful approach to the new issues posed by the fourth
revolution. In this respect, Byron raises several specific questions. Some are
reasonable. Some others seem to be based on a common misconception of Information
Ethics, which confuses informational entities with entities carrying information, when
in fact I am talking about informational entities in terms of entities understood
informationally, i.e. as informational patterns (see the article by Durante and my
reply). The essential problem at the roots of Byron’s misrepresentation of Information
Ethics is a lack of attention to the crucial role played by the concept of levels of
abstraction (see in this issue the article by Flavio Soares Correa da Silva and Tony
Doyle). If I do not deal with such questions in any detail here, this is only because they
were discussed fully, and I hope answered successfully, in another special issue
dedicated to my work on Information Ethics, to which I would like to refer the reader
(Floridi 2008c). It is a pity Byron does not take that work into account.
What I find puzzling in Byron’s approach, over and above his objections, is not
his criticism, but the conservative perspective from which the latter is articulated. It
is as if Byron were so keen on stressing the intellectual disruption brought about by
the fourth revolution—to be more revolutionary that the revolution—that nothing
old could possibly be heuristically helpful and anything new would be suspiciously
mysterious. Byron holds that “the fourth revolution must be deeply disruptive of our
dominant modes of ethical theorizing”. I fully sympathise. According to him, it will
break with past ethical discourses (he lists eudaimonism, deontologism and
consequentialism), bypass them entirely or render them obsolete. Although driven
by a much stronger sense of continuity and less of a sense of total disruption, I am
inclined to agree with him that an overall upgrade of our ethical perspective might be
in order. But then, despite all his emphasis on how remarkably revolutionary our
new post-fourth-revolution ethics will have to be, when presented with the
alternative of Information Ethics, instead of making an effort to consider whether
this might actually be the kind of quite new approach that requires a fresh start and
an innovative outlook, he entrenches himself in the conservative attitude of
considering Information Ethics inadequate because based on a “metaphysically
puzzling and mysteriously teleological definition of information as something that
strives to be realized”. I am not arguing here against the possibility that Information
Ethics might be the wrong way forward. I have defended it elsewhere. I am stressing
a more general need to keep an open mind towards alternative ways of approaching
the ethical discourse, and the more so the more one thinks that the disruption caused
by the fourth revolution is a historical fracture with the past. Radically new problems
may call for unorthodox ways of thinking. Approaching the latter with a
conservative attitude only ensures that the former will remain unsolved.
10 Reply to Doyle
The article by Doyle provides a summary of some essential tenets of Information
Ethics. This is the useful part. It also moves some objections against Information
Ethics. Unfortunately, this is the less valuable part, not because it is incorrect, but
because it is unacquainted with the literature. Similar objections have been articulated
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before and have been the subject of a lively and public debate, and I have dealt with
them in detail on several occasions. The interested reader is invited to check
& The special issues of the APA Newsletter on Computers and Philosophy, Spring
2008 Volume 07, Number 2 and Fall 2008, Volume 08, Number 1 (both freely
available online), and especially my replies to John Barker and Edward Howlett
Spence in Floridi (2008f; also freely available online)
& The special issue of Ethics and Information Technology, guest edited by Charles
Ess (2008), especially my reply to Phil Brey in Floridi (2008d; the latter is freely
available online)
& The special issue of Metaphilosophy, guest-edited by Patrick Allo (Allo 2010),
especially my reply to Richard Volkman in Floridi (2010c; freely available online
as well)
Of course, this is not to say that, on such occasions, I have countered all possible
objections against Information Ethics successfully—the reader is invited to judge.
But it does mean that it would have been interesting if Doyle’s article had taken into
account the current state of the debate and discussed how satisfactorily some of the
concerns it merely reiterates have actually been addressed. I am afraid objections fail
to acquire more force through mere repetition. Thus, claims like (all italics added)
the best Floridi can do [to support the expansion of the moral circle to the
whole of reality] is cite an apparent trend in moral philosophy towards even
greater inclusiveness; […]
so far as I can tell, the only reason that Floridi offers for IE’s theory of value is
the alleged trend itself; […]
aside from the argument from the expanding circle—which fails—Floridi
never argues for the claim that the landfill, conceived as a collection of
information objects, has intrinsic worth at all, let alone why those objects
should be worth more intact than in pieces; […]
so far as I can tell, the only case Floridi makes for his novel theory of value is
the argument from the expanding moral circle […]
are only evidence of poor scholarship, for they merely ignore the state of the current
debate and 10 years of discussion. The result is that the reader genuinely interested
in the current debate will not benefit much from this article but luckily can find a
valuable analysis in Durante’s well-informed and insightful contribution. So, at the
risk of boring the reader and repeating myself, in this inevitably short and selective
reply, I shall sketch briefly what a quick search on Google or PhilPapers (http://
philpapers.org/) would have helped Doyle to find. Again, my aim is not to prove that
I am right; I only intend to show that the arguments in favour of Information Ethics
are there for anyone to assess, if they care to engage with the literature and wish to
treat their questions as more than mere rhetorical devices.
Doyle is keen on defending an ethics broadly based on “interests”, where interests
are defined in terms of avoiding pain and seeking pleasure. Unquestionably, if one
sticks to the pain/pleasure scale, any talk about inanimate things, both biological and
artificial, indeed any reference to almost anything in the universe, with the exception
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of a few biological species on our planet, will count as nothing. When pain and
pleasure are in question, the only players in the ethical game are entities with a
nervous system, and not even as groups, or as a species, but as single, healthy,
individuals. Not even God, often considered the ultimate source of morality, may
count, insofar as any biological attribution of pain or pleasure to such hypothetical
entity would be preposterous (for the sake of clarity, let me hasten to add that I am
not endorsing here the existence of God, but the validity of the following
conditional: if God exists, then God should definitely count as a player in the
ethical game, but positions based on mere pain/pleasure cannot account for the
correctness of such conditional). Past or future generations, places and practices,
stars and valleys, monuments and shrines, companies and governments, flowers and
trees, a platoon or a team must also be disregarded. The Epicurean in each of us
finds this perfectly understandable, tenable and defensible. I find it not mistaken, but
unsatisfactorily limited. Not because it fails to square with the development of our
ethical concerns. It does, but, as Doyle repeatedly states in the article, this is plainly
not an argument, nor was it ever offered as such, since it was always meant to be just
a clarification of why we might be wondering about the value of extending our
environmental concerns these days. I find it unsatisfactorily limited because of a
number of arguments, some of which might be worth briefly rehearsing here, since
Doyle apparently failed to identify them (for further, valuable contributions see
Adam (2008) and Bynum (2010) and the articles by Durante and Flavio Soares
Correa da Silva in this special issue).
1. Why pleasure and pain, instead of existence/non-existence? After all, pleasure
and pain are Nature’s ways of signalling, to a very limited number of biological
species, environmental risks and benefits, existence-enhancing and existence-
debilitating or -threatening events. Being over-concerned with them is like being
over-concerned with an unpleasant (but of course very useful) fever, rather than
the nasty viral infection that causes it. It is like thinking that what is really right
or wrong with the dishwasher is the yellow light flashing, rather than the low
level of salt it indicates, and hence the issuing quality of its performance. Pain
and pleasure are the servants of life and death, of well- and ill-being and of
existence and non-existence. We should address their masters, the source of the
moral discourse, not the evolutionary contingent symptoms.
2. Why adopt a presumption of guilt (an entity is morally worthless unless proven
morally valuable), instead of a presumption of innocence (an entity is morally
valuable unless proven morally worthless)? If we were to follow Doyle, we
would be starting from the view that the set of entities that have some moral
value is empty and then revise such a position by progressively including types
of entities on the basis of considerations limited to the presence of a well-
functioning nervous system. The point here is not to reject such procedure as
unsuccessful. After all, I suspect that that is pretty much the way humanity has
been upgrading its ethical perspective for centuries, and my past reconstruction
of how our ethical discourse might have developed in Western philosophy was
based exactly on such a historical trend. The important point is to ask ourselves
what is so dogmatically untouchable about such a procedure. In the legal
system, we move exactly in the opposite direction. We presume innocence and
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ask for evidence against it. And we do this for excellent reasons: because we do
not trust our epistemic capacities nor the powers in charge of the legal system. In
the worst possible scenario, we would rather be wrong about treating as innocent
a guilty person than doing the opposite. Likewise, by default I would rather
(invite everybody to) exercise respect and care towards any part of the non-
biological universe, by treating it as morally valuable, than vice versa. And we
should rather have the powers in charge constrained by a presumption of
innocence, than vice versa. So I would rather have individuals, governments and
companies abide by the rule of presumption of moral value of the whole world in
which we live, no matter whether we are talking about a human artefact or a natural
environment, than vice versa. This is why I have argued for a similar approach in
ethics. By default, we should begin by exercising respect towards the whole of
reality, limiting it, qualifying it or even dropping it whenever necessary. Let us start
from a full set and proceed by impoverishing it, if necessary. Recall that I have also
defended a minimal and overridable respect for reality. Of course, having a lite
ontology will help, and that is why I suggest we adopt an informational ontology
(Ess 2009). But other Western philosophies (e.g. Platonism, Stoicism, Spinoza)
and Buddhism (Hongladarom 2008) have been suggesting roughly the same
approach for a long time, even without a philosophy of information, so this is an
open option, not a must. I have articulated this point about the enlargement by
showing that there is really no reason to stop lowering the line below which
something deserves to be morally disrespected. You can go all the way down and
lose nothing. This is worth emphasising. Since we are talking about fundamental
assumptions, it is hard to try to convince someone to change his outlook, but
consider the following argument.
3. Why be so scared about the ultimate extension of the circle of entities that in
principle, if possible, would deserve some (make it as minimal as you wish, but
not zero) degree of respect? If we are mistaken in including in our ethical
concerns the non-biological universe, nothing morally wrong will have
happened; if we are not mistaken, we will have been better moral agents. A
win–win situation.
4. Sometimes we wish to have practical motivations to accept an ethical
perspective, not just philosophical reasons. So try to ask yourself (this is not a
psychological experiment, it is a philosophical argument, just use Rawls’ veil of
ignorance together with Moore’s two worlds): would you prefer to live in a
universe where all human agents make their decisions by caring only about their
pains and pleasures, in which they really think that, and coherently behave as if,
“non-human animal life has no intrinsic worth. It is literally meaningless”? Or
would you rather live in a universe in which such agents take into account the
well-being of everything, more like Buddhism and Information Ethics and other
forms of Environmentalism suggest? I hope I can guess the answer.
Much more could be and has been said in favour of Information Ethics—e.g.
in terms of heuristic and hermeneutic value, when it comes to issues raised by
our information society, or fruitful applicability—but I hope the reader might
have gained a sufficient overview of the sort of arguments that have been
developed in its favour. Doyle will probably not like my conclusion, but after
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reading his article, I am even more convinced that we need to move firmly and
quickly towards an ethical perspective that drops our human chauvinism and
expands our ethical concerns beyond justified but insufficient concerns for our
pain and pleasure. Recent natural disasters suggest that the state of our nervous
system is hardly the only guideline sufficient to orientate our moral behaviours.
We are becoming too powerful, and we are still too accident-prone and
epistemically fallible to afford such a human-centric approach. One day, pace
Doyle, I hope we shall be able to define not only crimes against humanity but also
crimes against the earth and reality.
11 Reply to Hofkirchner
I cannot claim to have been able to appreciate in full all the points made by
Hofkirchner in his article. It seems that our divergences are more a matter of nuances
than substance, but as the reader knows, the devil loves details, for that is where it
hides more easily, so I might be wrong. I am also unclear about what Hofkirchner’s
proposal amounts to, over and above the mosaic of quotations and a revision of
some of my theses, but perhaps a good reply is that I need to go back to the drawing
board and just try harder. Of the many things touched upon in his article, I will
concentrate on two, which seem to me in need of some clarification. Perhaps the
dialogue can start from there, once the confusion is cleared up.
I am indebted to Hofkirchner for this opportunity to clarify that I had not heard of
Mazlish (1993) until I gave a talk at Yale in 2010 on the fourth revolution, when
Bonnie Kaplan very kindly called my attention to Mazlish’s “fourth discontinuity”.
Shame on me, since I realised that Mazlish published his essay, entitled “The Fourth
Discontinuity”, in 1967 (Mazlish 1967, repr. in Taviss 1970). Kaplan, as well as
Hofkirchner, spotted the family resemblance between Mazlish’s and my view.
However, she also saw the significant difference. Let me try to summarise it here as
succinctly as possible.
There are plenty of “fourthes”. Freud’s “three revolutions” is a very attractive
springboard, and I am hardly the first to use it to make a hermeneutical move
forward. Erik Erikson, for example, listed Einstein as a fourth revolutionary figure
(Hoare 2002, p. 133). More recently, it has been argued that the discovery of DNA
and the genetic code might also qualify, with a “fifth revolution” being represented
by the “neuroscience revolution” (Wired 2006). Examples could easily be
multiplied. What matters, obviously, is not who listed what and in which order,
but rather the nature of the hypothesis suggested and the reasons offered in its
favour. I have argued that the fourth revolution—with Turing as its most plausible
reference (Bolter 1984)—is a fruitful way of understanding the extraordinary impact
that computer science, ICT, digital technologies and more generally the information
society are exercising on our self-understanding. So far, the point does not differ
significantly from views such as those listed above. This is just a matter of logic: if
you are going to use Freud’s three revolutions, you are bound to talk about a change
in our self-understanding, brought about by some scientific development. The
philosophical effort only begins here, for it concerns the aforementioned devilish
details. The fourth revolution, as I described it, is most emphatically not about
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building artificial agents which might one day be confused with, or overcome, their
creators and hence change our self-understanding. I love science fiction, but I love
truth more and find the former dangerously distracting when dealing with serious
issues (see my replies to Ganascia and Byron). As a review in the New York Times
stated, “ultimately, his [Mazlish’s] book degenerates into [sci-fi] movie criticism”.2 I
have tried to stay away from such pitfalls. The change in our self-understanding
concerns the interpretation of ourselves as informational organisms (inforg),
which have much in common with other biological, artificial and hybrid inforgs.
It has to do with Artificial Companions (Floridi 2008a) not Terminator, with
GPS, not Star Trek teleportation, with the construction of personal identities on
Facebook, not with the force in Star Wars. This is where a firm grasp of the
method of abstraction and what it means to use a Level of Abstraction in order to
analyse a system, becomes a requirement rather than an option. Unfortunately,
there is no mention of any of this in Hofkirchner’s paper. As inforgs, we inhabit an
environment, the infosphere, which is full of other non-single-human agents,
including your credit card company. As inforgs endowed with a mental life and the
capacity to make sense of the world and think about the choices and consequences
of our actions, we are also the special agents who can and should take care of such
environment as a whole.
This leads me to a second point that left me slightly disappointed. The article is
rather cavalier towards Information Ethics, to say the least, but the criticisms moved
are ungrounded. Sound and informed criticisms are always welcome, but generic
comments based on a lack of serious engagement with the literature only indicate a
missed opportunity. I would like to ask the reader to compare this article with
Durante’s. Take the remark “This looks like the notorious naturalistic fallacy” and
the ensuing discussion. If something looks like the notorious naturalist fallacy, one
should equally suspect that it looks that way to others, including the proponent. So it
might be worth googling “luciano floridi naturalistic fallacy” and quickly discover
that I have dealt with the problem that “an ontocentric approach [such as the one I
have defended in Information Ethics] is often threatened with the naturalistic
fallacy” in Floridi (2008c). The whole text is online, so I shall spare the reader my
response. Of course, I may still be utterly wrong, but merely being told that I am
fails to convince me that I might be.
As I wrote at the beginning, I have the impression that there may be much that I
should learn from Hofkirchner’s article. The confusion might be my fault. I will have
to try harder.
12 Reply to Vakarelov
The paper by Vakarelov is a very welcome revival of a pragmatic and semiotic
approach to the philosophy of information, which had been disregarded for too long.
It is both instructive and original. I have the impression that its sophisticated
proposal is more complementary than alternative to the semantic approach I have
privileged in most of my writings. I specify “most” because, in at least two cases,
2 Available online, see http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/24/books/we-are-what-we-make.html
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when discussing the symbol grounding problem and the correctness theory of truth, I
have explicitly and extensively relied on a pragmatic approach (see now Floridi
2010b). More specifically, Vakarelov seems to me to be right, and in an interesting
way, when he writes that
According to this strategy [his pragmatic approach to semantic information], s is
an information system not because it operates with meaningful (and truthful)
data, i.e. because it operates with information, but conversely, it operates with
information because it is an information system. The most important idea is that
what counts as data and what gives the data semantic content is determined by
the role it plays in the information system (italics in the original).
I thoroughly agree. It is in the specific implementation of such an important idea
that Vakarelov and I might take different directions. Let me sketch mine and briefly
compare the two.
For some complicated reasons too long to explain here, some recent research on
the informational interpretation and construction of personal identity (Floridi 2005,
2006) has led me to realise something that is almost embarrassingly obvious:
Shannon’s classic model, even when stripped of all its complex features and reduced
to the simple quadruple <Sender, Channel, Message, Receiver>, presupposes a very
rich and developed environment, where entities are already constituted as senders
and receivers before any information flow takes place. Indeed, they actually make
possible the presence of a message-passing system. This is perfectly fine for any
engineering purpose, but hardly satisfactory from a philosophical perspective. How
did the entities in question come to play the roles of senders and receivers? From a
biological view, it is obvious that organisms, understood as natural information
systems—I am following Vakarelov’s terminology here, although I would call
them natural data systems myself—postdate the availability of the sort of data that
they can exploit in order to survive, flourish and reproduce. With a classic
example, also used by Vakarelov: in logical order, first comes the oxygen-rich vs.
oxygen-poor environment and then bacteria able to exploit such difference. The
biological debt incurred by organisms is one way: they owe their existence to the
data in the environment, which owe them nothing. Now, I have remarked in many
occasions that data are, ontologically interpreted, differences or points of lack of
uniformity. Put together the biological and the ontological suggestions and what
you obtain is a thesis that can be phrased in Biblical terms: in the beginning were
the data. Natural information (or, better, data) systems came later. The same thesis
can be formulated negatively: no data, no differences, no organisms, no natural
information systems, no minds. It seems to me that this is the right way of
approaching the naturalization of information so well analysed by Vakarelov.
Replace “influences” with data in Vakarelov’s paper and you will see that we are
probably pointing in the same direction. He might disagree, however, because he
seems to have a more “semantic” notion of data (e.g. as digits in a spreadsheet).
There are other places where the terminology of the paper does not help the
dialogue on the issues at stake. For example, goal-oriented behaviour is better
understood by specifying the level of abstraction at which, and above all, through
which, it is identified. Likewise, in a context where “information” and
“informational” are highly technical terms, more care should be exercised in
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talking about systems as information systems. Strictly speaking, bacteria, for
example, are really data systems, insofar as they lack any semantic capacity.
Nothing has any meaning to a bacterium, if not metaphorically. But these are
details, and some conceptual negotiations could easily reduce the distance between
Vakarelov’s approach and mine. However, things seem to be somewhat less
reconcilable when our mutual strategies are in question. Vakarelov’s paper appears
to endorse a reductively naturalistic attitude. It seeks to naturalise semantic
information from beginning to end, from thermostats to bacteria to humans. In
contrast, I do take naturalism to be a very reasonable (perhaps the only sensible) way of
explaining the beginning of the story about semantic information, but I also hold the
view that naturalism does not have boundless explanatory scope. For it seems to me that
it can hardly account for some of the most interesting aspects of the development of
semantic information. It does not tell us much about the plot and the end of the story.
Metaphor aside, a semantic approach (what Vakarelov calls the amendment view) can be
fully naturalistic about the pre- and post-biotic emergence of semantic information,
without being reductionism when it comes to understand what epistemic agents are able
to do with semantic information mentally, culturally and normatively. For example, the
reader might wish to check Gillies’ paper in this collection to see very quickly that there
is little hope to provide a satisfactory account of mathematical information from a
naturalistic-only perspective. Or she might consider Durante’s discussion of the
normative aspects of a philosophy of information or the analysis of testimony in
Piazza’s contribution. Information starts as a natural phenomenon but ends as a mental
one. No methodological approach that ignores this fact can provide a satisfactory
philosophy of information. Focusing exclusively on one side of the bridge means
missing a significant and substantial part of the picture. If we need a term, we might be
calling the complementary approach the semanticisation (the process of giving meaning
and sense to something) of information. The problems caused by an exclusively
naturalistic analysis of semantic information are those typical of any tunnel-vision:
an initially fruitful focus soon becomes blindness to other significant aspects of the
targeted topic. Thus, Peirce, who knew very well the advantages and disadvantages
of (what we have labelled) naturalization, insisted that semantic information requires
a mental life and ideation to be explicated. As Vakarelov reminds us, Peirce was
unhappy about the qualification of sunflowers as information systems. He was right.
Sunflowers are not even data systems, like bacteria, for they are coupled to the
environment by co-varying relations that are only misrepresented by an informa-
tional analysis. Since Peirce had a rather comprehensive concept of the mental, we
might translate his point in terms of cognition. Semantic information requires some
cognition, at least in terms of the capacity to interpret something as something else,
for example the vibration on the web as a signal by the spider that a prey has been
captured. If one keeps refining Nauta’s definition of information system until it is
fully explicit and adequate, my impression is that one ends up with something that
is equivalent to a cognitive system. Unsurprisingly, Vakarelov disagrees with this
line of reasoning. He writes: “His [Peirce’s] solution was to insist that the
interpretant of the sign [semantic information] must be a mind. From a naturalistic
standpoint this is unacceptable”. Vakarelov is right, it is unacceptable, but so was
Peirce, a mind is required, so this is precisely why a naturalistic standpoint is
insufficient to make sense of information. A semantic standpoint is inevitable.
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13 Reply to Yukio-Pegio Gunji, Takayuki Niizato, HisashiMurakami and Iori Tani
The article by Gunji, Niizato, Murakami and Tani seeks to extend some results
obtained in the philosophy of information to the biological sciences and, in
particular, to zoology. I am intrigued by such developments. Certainly, their analysis
of the concept of flattening seems to deserve both careful study and further
development. In order to contribute to such interdisciplinary dialogue, let me offer a
clarification concerning the notion of change.
One of the most abstract observations possible of a population is its size or
cardinality as a set, that is, the number of its members. In the terminology of the
method of abstraction (Floridi 2008e, 2010a, b), that is an observable of type WHOLE
NUMBER, and it is well-typed provided that the population is finite and well-defined.
At this LoA, a population provides no more information than its size. There is no
distinction between live populations, artificial populations and for that matter, any
ordinary set. In order to gain more information, one may then add one more
observable, call it generation number of each member. Its type is FUNCTION FROM
MEMBERS OF THE POPULATION TO WHOLE NUMBERS: the argument of the function is the
member of the population, and the result is its generation number. If the original
members of the population were observable, then some convention would be
necessary for their generation number; a reasonable choice would be 0. More details
can easily be added. A more general alternative, always well-typed, is obtained by
assuming time (rather than generation number) to be observable and observing the
size of the population at any time. The result is of type FUNCTION FROM TIMES TO
WHOLE NUMBERS. An interface (a Loa) containing such observables, though simple,
would be sufficient to support the well-known Fibonacci model of population size
per generation. At this LoA, a population provides no more information than its
growth. However, this might be already of some interest if we include additional
observables such as the rates of birth, mortality, migration or harvesting. It is
sufficient, for example, to discuss age distribution across the population and for the
management of pest populations, for the harvesting of natural populations, for the
modelling of insect outbreaks, of interacting populations and so on. One further step,
in revealing information about the population, is to investigate aspects of the state of
its members, perhaps the simplest being position. Thus, one may consider spatial
distribution as a further observable. If the population consists of cellular automata,
then the distribution is a subset of automaton positions, namely those positions at
which automata are located. If it consists of a population of animals, then the
observable’s type is some mathematical representation of the domain inhabited by
the animals, for example a map with a point on it for each animal. In the case of bird
flocks, as well illustrated by the authors of the article, it is of interest to observe
spatial distribution at time t, whose type is FUNCTION FROM TIMES TO SPATIAL
DISTRIBUTIONS. This LoA is sufficient for many studies of population dynamics,
both in biological and in artificial contexts. One may, for example, consider the
population of “bicycles in Oxford”. They arrive in Oxford, move around, sometimes
in correlated ways or at specific times (e.g. according to the lecturing schedule) and
even leave. The story is that they are stolen and sold in Cambridge, and vice versa,
thus giving the impression of a sort of two-way migration pattern. At this LoA, they
appear to be equivalent to entities which are born, graze, possibly migrate and die. In
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terms of recycling of parts, they might even be seen as reproducing. Alternatively,
for a system of cellular automata, spatial distribution can be seen as a special case of
individual state, in which state contains just one bit of information: dead or alive. In
all these examples, the population forms a dynamical system whose next state is a
function of just the current state, and at least (part of) the current state is observed.
This important setting characterises most modelling in applied mathematics and
computer science. It implicitly endorses a very strong assumption: the Markovian
nature of the transfer function. This means that state transitions (both continuous and
discrete) are treated as a process in which the probability of the system to be in state
X at time t+1 is dependent only upon the state (and hence the properties) Y of the
system at the immediately preceding time t. Intuitively, this is why you can join a
chess game at any time and still follow what is happening, or become an expert in
chess endings: the state of the chessboard at t+1 depends only on the state of the
chessboard at t. Such Markovian approach (the causal version is known as the causal
Markov condition), interpreted from the perspective of a philosophy of information
and a method of abstraction, seems to be neither a case of discovery—since the
world often appears to be more inextricably complex and intertwined than a chess
game—nor a case of mere invention—the successful nature of our epistemic efforts
based on Markov analyses hardly justifies a complete form of scepticism, as if
Markov conditions were artificially and externally imposed on a recalcitrant world. It
seems more a case of design features: our method of abstraction, both theoretically
and empirically (whenever it makes sense to talk of algorithms, the actual software
programs and the resulting simulations), naturally leads to a Markovian approach,
and at the same time, it privileges and makes more salient those features and aspects
of the systems under observation that are Markov-friendly. And this points in the
direction of a more metaphysical lesson. Differential equations, state transitions,
Bayesian networks, Markov chains and so forth should be seen more as ways of re-
structuring the targeted systems (structures), after they have been articulated (de-
structured) in figures or states, nodes or events. The reifying nature of our cognitive
approach is such that we first of all look at a billiard game (the structure) as divided
(de-structured) into sequences of well-formed events, in which well-formed and
independent objects, with specific properties, behave in such a way as to generate
transformations. We then find such dismembered (de-structured) system in need of
re-composition, or reconstruction (re-structuring). As in the case of a vase which we
have first shattered into pieces—or like a Humean philosopher thinking that there are
actually two events in the world, one consisting of a stone flying against the window
and the second consisting of the window breaking—we are then left with the task of
gluing together what was intact and in one piece in the first place. Such re-
structuring of a de-structured structure cannot restore the pristine state. To put it in
Humean terms, causing is not necessitating; there is no necessity linking the de-
structured event A and event B, for the simple fact that if there were, we would not
be able to split the two events in A and B. The broken glass will not be fully restored, yet
it is crucial to realise that this is not a problem at all, for the re-structuring follows
normative rules (how the modelling should be done), like the Markov condition, which
are not meant to ensure that the re-structuredmodel is indistinguishable from the original
un-de-structured system. Their goal is epistemic and pragmatic—understanding,
prediction, explanation, control, modification, construction, reproducibility—not
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metaphysical (grasping as far as possible the essential nature of the system), and this is
what both justifies the de-structuring in the first place and what guides the re-structuring
afterwards. Causality is an epistemic glue.
14 Reply to Durante
I learnt much from Durante’s article. His treatment of issues, which seem to have
baffled less sharp colleagues, is both original and enlightening. His analysis of the
informational nature of Being, for example, and of the correlated issue concerning
the richness of Being understood informationally, is impeccable. The same holds
true for his discussion of the essential notions of data, lack of uniformity, difference
and relation. Here is a wonderful instance of his interpretation:
When destroying informational objects, not only we erase differences, but we
tear also the threads of those relations, with a result of a stratified
impoverishment of the infosphere and of pluralism: in effect, pluralism is not
only concerned with the elimination of the secondary manifestations of the
variety of informational objects (implemented in material objects), but it is
embedded in the ontological roots of the infosphere.
If I may issue a recommendation, I would strongly advice any reader interested in
grasping the nature of Information Ethics to study his article. But I do not wish to
waste this opportunity by only praising Durante’s work. I would rather add at least
one further reflection, which I hope will contribute to the ongoing debate on the
nature and scope of Information Ethics.
The reflection concerns the special nature of human beings in the universe. Not a
small topic, I know. That is why I shall follow Plato, who, in the Phaedrus (246a),
acknowledges that
To tell what it really is [the form of the soul, or for us the special nature of
human beings] would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse,
but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore
speak in that way.
In other words, allow me to be metaphorical.
In the informational fabric that we call Being, there are some special nodes. They
are unlike any other kinds of nodes. Perhaps they emerge out of an odd evolution of
unrepeatable chances. Think of them as Nature’s beautiful mistake. They were not
meant to be there, like a unique kind of a most unlikely pattern, but they have
occurred, and they can now marvel at the most improbable chances that brought
them into existence. Or perhaps they have a divine origin, as Plato thought. Either
way, these nodes are informational structures like all other nodes, encapsulated
packets of differences, relations and processes, which contribute to the value and
richness of the whole. Their special nature lies not in what they are—in their physics
and biochemistry, to use a different level of abstraction—but in what they can do, for
they are structuring structures, the ultimate defence against entropy/evil. They are
the loci where the flow of information reaches its maturity and becomes self-
conscious, capable of self-determination and able to decouple itself from the rest of
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the fabric and reflecting on its own nature and status, thus shifting from a Darwinian,
physical evolution to a Lamarckian, mental development (we have developed
incommensurably faster than our bodies). Such nodes, you and I included, have an
unclear destiny. They might hope that their moral struggle against entropy is actually
a small episode in a divine plan. If so, this can only be reason for rejoicing. Or they
might fear that such a struggle is unfortunately only a titanic effort in an
unrewarding and lonely universe, a thin red line against the vandalism of time,
whose failure can be delayed and mitigated, but not avoided. If so, this should still
be reason for some modest rejoicing,3 for they will have helped reality to die of a
more graceful death. Such nodes are the stewards of Being. They may do whatever
they like, as long as they are careful.
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